Subjects are randomization-loving if they prefer random mixtures of two bets to each of the involved bets. Various approaches appeal to such preferences in order to explain uncertainty aversion. We examine the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude experimentally. Our data suggests that they are not negatively associated: most uncertainty-averse subjects are randomization-neutral rather than loving. Surprisingly, a non-negligible number of uncertainty-averse subjects even seems to dislike randomization.
Introduction
The canonical paradigm for economists to model choice behavior under uncertainty is that of subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) . Ellsberg (1961) challenged this paradigm by suggesting a series of experiments. Consider, for example, two urns that are lled with yellow and white balls.
In one urn, half of the balls are yellow, the other white. In the other urn, the proportion of yellow and white balls is unknown. A ball is drawn and subjects receive 100 if they guess the color correctly, and nothing otherwise. Many subjects are indierent between yellow and white but strictly prefer betting on the urn with known proportions (urn K) to betting on the urn with unknown proportions (urn U). They are uncertainty-averse and their choices violate subjective expected utility theory; moreover, their behavior is not consistent with probabilistic sophistication in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) .
Suppose now that subjects have access to a fair coin. After drawing a ball from urn U, subjects ip this coin to decide on which color to bet. Raia (1961) and also Ellsberg (1962) argue that by tossing a fair coin and betting on yellow when heads appear and on white otherwise, the objective chances of winning the bet are 50% and thus identical to those when betting on urn K. Following this argument, uncertainty-averse subjects should prefer a mixture between betting on white and yellow to betting on either white or yellow when they face uncertainty. In short, uncertainty-averse subjects should be randomization-loving. We design and implement an experiment to examine whether subjects' behavior is consistent with this reasoning.
In view of the overwhelming empirical evidence pointing to uncertainty aversion (see the survey article by Camerer and Weber, 1992) , various alternatives to subjective expected utility theory have been proposed: Schmeidler's Choquet expected utility model (1989) , the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , the smooth second-order prior model of Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) , and the variational preferences model of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) . Many of these alternatives adopt the idea that subjects prefer random mixtures to formally model uncertainty aversion. Whether uncertainty-averse subjects are indeed randomization-loving has been debated (Eichberger and Kelsey, 1996; Ghirardato, 1997; Klibano, 2001 ).
1 Moreover, equilibrium predictions in games with uncertainty-averse players depend on whether such players prefer randomization (Klibano 1996 and Lo 1996) , or not (Dow and Werlang 1994 , Eichberger and Kelsey 2000 , and Marinacci 2000 . Here, we analyze the relationship between different attitudes towards uncertainty and randomization in an experimental study.
Subjects in the experiment were faced with three random devices: an urn with a known proportion of yellow and white balls, an urn with an unknown proportion, and a coin. We oered bets based on these devices (called tickets) and elicited subjects' valuations for these tickets. Our denition of uncertainty attitude reects the idea that uncertainty-averse subjects value tickets on urn K more than on urn U and can be derived using the two-stage approach proposed by Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . Randomization attitude is measured using a ticket that involves deliberate randomization between betting on white and on yellow when facing urn U, called chameleon ticket. A subject who prefers the chameleon ticket to betting on urn U is classied as randomization-loving. The employed notions of uncertainty and randomization attitude are independent of each other and hence suited to empirically study the relationship between uncertainty aversion and preferences for randomization without foreclosing results.
Existing theories restrict the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude in several ways that we can directly test with our experimental setup. First, the notion of mixture over bets embodied in Schmeidler's denition of uncertainty aversion coincides with our denition of randomization-loving for subjects who are 1 Recently, a similar debate arose with respect to the smooth second-order prior model (Epstein, 2009; Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji, 2009) . indierent between betting on yellow and white given urn U. This notion, which is at the heart of uncertainty aversion in various models, suggests our rst hypothesis: randomization and uncertainty attitude are negatively related, i.e., uncertainty aversion is associated with randomization-loving preferences and vice versa.
Second, and somewhat more specically, given that uncertainty aversion is modeled as Choquet expected utility with convex capacities, there are dierent predictions about randomization attitudes depending on how the randomization device is modeled. The more popular way is to model the device in the Anscombe-Aumann framework (1963) as part of the consequence space (C-approach). For this approach, Schmeidler (1989) proves that decision makers with convex capacities are always randomization-loving. On the other hand, the randomization device can also be modeled in the Savage setup (1954) as a part of an extended state space (S-approach).
2 For the S-approach, Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) show that decision makers with convex capacities are randomization-neutral. These two diverging predictions yield the following hypotheses: uncertainty-averse subjects who are indifferent between betting on white and yellow when facing urn U are (i) randomizationloving (C-approach) or (ii) randomization-neutral (S-approach).
The main nding is that uncertainty and randomization attitude seem to be unrelated; the null hypothesis that they are independent cannot be rejected at any conventional level. If anything, association measures suggest that uncertainty-averse subjects are randomization-averse rather than loving. This nding questions the descriptive validity of preferences for random mixtures as a suitable notion for uncertainty aversion.
The second nding is that uncertainty-averse subjects who are indierent between betting on white and yellow when facing urn U are more likely to be randomization-neutral rather than loving. The S-approach thus ts our data better than the 2 Choquet expected utility preferences in the Savage (1954) setting were axiomatized by Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) . C-approach. However, a sizeable number of these subjects is randomization-averse, which neither of the two approaches predicts.
Our hypotheses apply only to subjects with specic preferences. Being concerned about selection eects, we check for selection on observables and re-examine results on the full sample; our ndings seem robust.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the experimental design. In Section 3, we formally dene randomization and uncertainty attitude and derive our main hypotheses. Section 4 deals with the implementation, Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
Experimental design
In order to examine the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude, information about both attitudes from the same subject is required. We elicited the value of various bets, which are based on three random devices. This section describes the random devices, the bets, and the elicitation mechanism.
Random devices
During the experiment, we use three dierent random devices: an urn with 20 table tennis balls of which half were white and the other half yellow (urn with known proportions or short: urn K), an urn with 20 table tennis balls with an unknown proportion of yellow and white balls (short: urn U), and a coin.
Subjects were informed that only white and yellow balls are used in the experiment. Urn K's contents were shown to the subjects before the experiment, while urn U's contents were only revealed after the experiment. During the experiment, both urns were placed on a table in view of the subjects to demonstrate to them that the contents cannot be manipulated. For similar reasons, the coin was volunteered by one of the subjects and not by us.
Tickets
In the experiment bets were called tickets and outcomes were expressed in Taler, our experimental currency unit. While subjects knew that they would be oered dierent tickets involving the three random devices, they did not know which or how many tickets they would face. In order to later identify subjects who regard the coin as fair, we introduced the following tickets.
1. Head ticket, h: 100 Taler are paid if the coin lands heads up and nothing otherwise.
2. Tails ticket, t: 100 Taler are paid if the coin lands tails up and nothing otherwise.
To elicit uncertainty attitude, we ask the subjects to evaluate the following tickets for urn K. Uncertainty attitude is then detected by comparing the subject's certainty equivalent for these tickets with that of the following similar tickets for urn U. The next ticket involves two random devices: the coin and urn U. The subject always receives a ticket for urn U. Whether this ticket will be yellow or white is determined by ipping the coin. Since the color of the ticket changes with the outcome of the coin toss, we use the name chameleon ticket.
7. Chameleon ticket for urn U, c U : If the coin lands heads up, the subject receives a yellow ticket for urn U. If the coin lands tails up the subject receives a white ticket for urn U.
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By comparing the certainty equivalent for the chameleon ticket with that of a yellow or white ticket for urn U, we can infer whether a subject is randomization-loving.
For our predictions later, it must be possible to identify whether subjects are indierent between yellow and white tickets on urn U. This necessitates that subjects are asked about both tickets, which in principle allows them to hedge against uncertainty. The danger of hedging against uncertainty is that subjects no longer exhibit uncertainty aversion. We tried to reduce this danger by not informing subjects about the number and types of bets and switching the order in which tickets are presented for urn U. Consequently, subjects do not know that there will be a hedging opportunity when evaluating the yellow ticket for urn U. As we will see later, our method was successful in the sense that the proportion of uncertainty-averse subjects in our experiment is in line with that of similar experiments.
Eliciting ticket values
In order to elicit ticket values, we employ the following procedure. For each ticket, the subject had to make twenty choices. The rst choice was between a ticket and a payment of 2.5 Taler. The second was between a ticket and a payment of 7.5 Taler etc. The payments oered to the subject increased in steps of 5 Taler until the last choice, in which the subject had to choose between a ticket and 97.5 Taler. The 3 Put dierently, the subject receives 100 Taler in two cases: if the coin lands heads up and the drawn ball from urn U is yellow and if the coin lands tails up and the ball drawn from urn U is white. In the other two cases, the subject receives nothing. point at which the subject switches from the ticket to the payment then reveals the value of the ticket to the subject (up to 5 Taler). All of the subject's choices were implemented and aected the subject's payo. To ensure independence, a separate draw was carried out for each ticket. The draws took place after all choices were made to avoid wealth eects.
Many experiments employ less time-consuming and laborious methods of paying subjects by combining choices over bets with additional randomization (see e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002; Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) . Such methods have also been used in experiments on uncertainty. For example, Hey, Lotito, and Maoletti (2008) randomly select only one of the subjects' choices to be payo-relevant, while Halevy (2007) employs the mechanism by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) .
In the Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism, the subject receives a ticket and states the certainty equivalent. Then, a random oer is generated and the subject has to sell the ticket if the oer exceeds the stated value.
Despite the considerable eort involved, we decided to pay all decisions rather than employing a mechanism that relies on additional randomization. We do so for two reasons. First, as Karni and Safra (1987) point out, a method based on additional randomization, such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, is no longer guaranteed to elicit the true (subjective) value for subjects who violate the independence axiom.
4 Since uncertainty-averse subjects violate the independence axiom and we are interested in their valuations, we cannot use this mechanism.
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Second, had we introduced another source of randomness, all bets faced by the subject would have been compounded; none would have been purely based on the 4 A similar observation has been made by Holt (1986) . The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism also fails to elicit true valuations if the compound lottery axiom is violated (Segal, 1988) . 5 Apart from the theoretical argument, there is empirical evidence that preference reversals in measurements of uncertainty aversion occur when using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanismsee Trautmann, Vieider, and Wakker (2009). three devices that we are interested in (urn K, urn U, coin). By implementing all choices, we avoid that randomization attitude interacts with other sources of randomness.
Uncertainty and randomization attitude
In this section, we dene randomization and uncertainty attitude, relate them to concepts from the literature, and derive empirical predictions. Let L be the set of tickets faced by subjects in our experiment. The binary relation represents subjects preferences over L. Denote by µ(l) a subject's certainty equivalent or value of ticket l in L. For any two tickets k and l in L, we say that subjects weakly prefer k to l, written k l, if and only if µ(k) µ(l).
Denitions
Comparing the certainty equivalents for the white and yellow ticket for urn U with that for the chameleon ticket, we can classify subjects according to their randomization attitudes. Consider a subject who favors the yellow ticket y U to the white ticket w U for urn U , i.e., y U w U . Such a subject is randomization-averse if she values the chameleon ticket even less than the white ticket w U . Conversely, this subject is randomization-loving if she values the chameleon ticket even more than the yellow ticket y U . If a subject values the chameleon ticket weakly more than the white ticket w U but weakly less than the yellow ticket w U , we say she is randomization-neutral.
The next denition formalizes this idea, where s U and t U stands for the favorite and least favorite ticket on urn U.
Denition 1 (Randomization attitude). A subject with s
As will become clear later, this denition coincides with the idea of a preference for convex combinations embodied in Schmeidler's uncertainty aversion axiom (1989) for subjects who are indierent between the yellow and white ticket on urn U.
Subjects are typically regarded to be uncertainty-averse if they prefer betting on the urn with known proportions of yellow and white balls. Let us be more precise about this statement by considering a subject who weakly prefers the yellow to the white ticket on both urns (y K 
The following denition generalizes this idea to arbitrary preferences, where q K and r K stands for the favorite and least favorite ticket on urn K, and s U and t U for the favorite and least favorite ticket on urn U. The dened order is complete: each preference is either uncertainty-averse, uncertainty-loving, or uncertainty-neutral.
Denition 2 (Uncertainty attitude). A subject with q Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) suggest a two-stage approach to dene uncertainty attitude. In this approach, rst a comparative notion for uncertainty aversion is established. Then, an absolute denition for uncertainty aversion is derived. The comparative denition is based on the following idea: if a subject prefers an unambiguous bet to an ambiguous one, then a more uncertaintyaverse subject will do the same. For the second stage, a class of uncertainty-neutral preferences is chosen. Then, a subject is uncertainty-averse if there is a benchmark preference order in this class such that the subject is more uncertainty-averse than this benchmark. Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) dier in their assumptions about the benchmark and what is regarded as an unambiguous bet.
Taking subjective expected utility preferences as a benchmark and regarding bets on the urn with known proportions of balls as unambiguous, the two stage approach yields the above denition (see Proposition 1 in appendix).
Predictions
The general denitions allow for any combination of uncertainty and randomization attitude. For example, a subject may in principle be uncertainty-neutral but like randomization or it may be averse to uncertainty and randomization. This section uses existing theoretical models to restrict the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude and derive predictions.
In order to represent uncertainty aversion, a large class of models appeals to Schmeidler's notion (1989) that a mixture between two bets is preferred to each of the bets itself. In the specic framework used by Schmeidler, bets are mappings from events to probability distributions over the set of payos, so that the convex combination of two bets, f and g: αf + (1 − α)g with α ∈ (0, 1) is well dened.
Schmeidler calls a subject with f g uncertainty-averse if
Intuitively, smoothing utility across ambiguous events makes an uncertainty-averse subject better o. In perfect analogy, subjects are uncertainty-loving if αf + (1 − α)g f. For subjects who violate the independence axiom, preferences are strict.
Taking`yellow' and`white' to be events and the probability distribution in each event to result from the coin ip, the chameleon ticket is a convex combination in the sense of Schmeidler. The axiom then means that uncertainty-averse subjects strictly prefer the chameleon ticket, i.e., the mixture of two bets, to the least favorite ticket on urn U. Likewise, uncertainty-loving subjects should prefer their favorite ticket on urn U to the chameleon ticket.
For subjects who are indierent between white and yellow on urn U, y U ∼ w U ,
Schmeidler's notion fully coincides with our denition of randomization attitude (see Denition 1). Based on the various models that appeal to this notion in order to explain uncertainty attitude, we hence predict uncertainty-averse subjects to be randomization-loving and uncertainty-loving subjects to be randomization-averse
Hypothesis 1
For subjects who are indierent between the yellow and white ticket on urn U, y U ∼ w U , uncertainty and randomization attitude are negatively associated: uncertaintyaverse subjects are randomization-loving and vice versa.
As the null hypothesis, we consider that uncertainty and randomization attitude are not associated.
If uncertainty aversion is modeled using Choquet expected utility models with convex capacities, the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude depends on whether the randomization device is modeled as part of the consequence space (C-approach) or as a part of an extended state space (S-approach). Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) show that uncertainty-averse decision makers who are indierent between two bets based on an uncertain urn, y U ∼ w U , and who regard the randomization device as fair, h ∼ t, are randomization-loving in the C-approach but are randomization-neutral in the S-approach. This directly leads to the hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 C Uncertainty-averse subjects with y U ∼ w U and h ∼ t are randomization-loving.
Hypothesis 2 S
Uncertainty-averse subjects with y U ∼ w U and h ∼ t are randomization-neutral.
We test these two alternatives against the null hypothesis that uncertainty-averse subjects with y U ∼ w U and h ∼ t are equally likely to be randomization-neutral and randomization-loving.
Implementation
We ran a total of 5 sessions with 90 subjects. All sessions were conducted in the experimental laboratory at the University of Mannheim in September 2008. Subjects were primarily students who were randomly recruited from a pool of approximately 1000 subjects using an e-mail recruitment system. Each subject only participated in one of the sessions. Ticket values were elicited electronically using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
After the subjects' arrival at the laboratory, they were randomly seated at the computer terminals. Instructions were read out loud and ticket types were practi-cally explained. Then, the subjects were given time to study the instructions (see appendix for a translation). Finally, they were asked to answer a series of questions to test their understanding of the instructions. During all this time, subjects could ask the experimenters clarifying questions. This part lasted about 30 minutes. It was followed by the evaluation of the tickets. In order to simplify the input for subjects, we programmed a slider that allowed them to specify their value for each ticket. The program then automatically selected choices that were consistent with this ticket value. Using the slider was not obligatory and a subject could arbitrary alter its choice until he or she decided to nish evaluation of a specic ticket (see Figure 6 in the appendix for a screen shot). After the evaluation of tickets, we asked subjects questions about their demographics and attitudes toward uncertainty. We also gave them some problems to test their statistics knowledge and cognitive ability. Subjects took about 30 minutes for this second part. The last and nal part required drawing balls and ipping coins in order to determine payos. With 8 types of tickets and twenty choices between ticket and xed payment for each type, subjects could obtain up to 160 tickets. This last part required roughly 30 minutes so that the whole experiment lasted about 90 minutes.
At the end of the experiment, we paid each subject privately in cash. All payos were initially explained in Taler that were later converted using the rate of 100
Taler=10 cents. Subjects earned on average 11.35 Euro.
Results
Two subjects violated transitivity in their choices, which leaves us with 88 independent observations. In line with previous experimental studies (see Camerer and Weber, 1992) , many subjects exhibit the Ellsberg paradox: a share of about 55%
prefer betting on the urn with known proportions, while ca. 9% prefer betting on the urn with unknown proportions, and roughly 36% are indierent.
Main ndings
In order to formally check Hypothesis 1, we restrict our sample to subjects who value white and yellow ticket on urn U equally, so that Schmeidler's notion of mixture preference co-incides with the denition of randomization attitude. Since about a third of the subjects prefer a ticket of one color on urn U, the analysis is based on 53 observations. Result 1. For subjects who value white and yellow tickets on urn U equally, uncertainty and randomization attitude are not negatively associated.
From the literature, we expect uncertainty-averse subjects to be randomizationloving and uncertainty-loving subjects to be randomization-averse. Accordingly, observations should lie on the diagonal from the top-left to the bottom-right in 6 Moreover, the number of observations that lie on the other diagonal and are consistent with a positive relationship is higher (25 out of 53). Accordingly, Goodman and Kruskal's γ as well as Kendall's τ b , which can be used to measure the association between the two ordinally scaled attitudes, are both positive. If there is any tendency to reject independence it is hence in favor of a positive rather than a negative relationship.
Recall that S-and C-approach lead to diverging predictions about the randomization attitude of uncertainty-averse subjects, regard the coin as fair, and value white and yellow ticket on urn U equally. This concerns 29 subjects in our sample.
The C-approach predicts these subjects to like randomization, while the S-approach predicts them to be randomization-neutral. Result 2. Consider uncertainty-averse subjects who regard the coin as fair and value the yellow and white ticket on urn U equally. These subjects are more likely to be randomization-neutral rather than randomization-loving.
Sixteen of the 20 subjects are randomization-neutral, while four prefer randomizationsee Figure 1 . The hypothesis that subjects are equally likely to be randomization-loving or neutral can be rejected at any conventional level (The respective binomial test has a p-value below 0.01): a signicantly larger fraction of subjects is randomization-neutral.
This result can be extended to uncertainty-loving subjects, who are supposed to dislike randomization according to the C-approach and to be randomization-neutral according to the S-approach. Two uncertainty-loving subjects are randomizationneutral and one is randomization-averse. Overall, 18 of 23 observations are in line with the S-approach and only 5 with the C-approach. Again, a uniform distribution of randomization attitudes can be rejected in favor of the predictions consistent with the S-approach at any conventional level (p-value below 0.01). 
Robustness
The theoretical results, which underpin Hypothesis 1 and 2, only apply to subjects with specic preferences. Consequently, Result 1 and 2 are based on a selected sample of subjects, which may not only dier by their preferences but by other characteristics.
We check whether any selection on observables has taken place by running two probit regressions. Hypothesis 1 requires subjects to be indierent between the yellow and white ticket on urn U. This indierence, however, does not seem to be related to observables: the null hypothesis that no observable aects the probability of being indierent cannot be rejected (p-value of the likelihood ratio test: 0.43, see Table 6 in the appendix). For Hypothesis 2, subjects must additionally regard the coin as fair. This time there is some indication that observables aect selection (p-value for the likelihood ratio test: 0.04). More specically, subjects who correctly compute the probability of two independently thrown dice (variable: stats knowledge 2) are signicantly more likely to be in the sample (see Table 7 in the appendix).
There is, however, no reason why statistically more literate subjects should be less inclined to prefer randomization.
The subjects on which we test our hypotheses may also dier in unobservable ways from our full sample. The independence between uncertainty and randomization attitude could, for example, be driven by the fact that subjects who are indifferent between white and yellow tickets on urn U systematically dier from other subjects. In order to refute this idea, we re-examine the relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude without restricting attention to certain preferences. Of course, Hypotheses 1 and 2 no longer apply in this case. If, however, results are similar, we can be condent that they do not hinge on an alternative explanation such as a general trait to value tickets equally. Table 2 exhibits the attitudes when all subjects are considered. Both ndings are conrmed. First, the null hypothesis that uncertainty aversion and random preference are unrelated cannot be rejected (p-value of Fisher's exact test: 0.18). As before, the data suggests that uncertainty aversion is associated positively with randomization aversion. Second, uncertaintyaverse subjects tend to be randomization-neutral rather than randomization-loving and uncertainty-loving subjects are more likely to be randomization-neutral than to be randomization-averse (p-value for the two-sided binomial test is below 0.01). This robustness of results gives us some condence that they are not driven by selection eects.
U ncertainty Attitude
Averse N eutral Loving T otal 
Other Findings
In addition to these results, which directly relate to our hypotheses, we also want to report on two additional and unexpected ndings.
The rst nding concerns randomization-and uncertainty-averse subjects. We expected to nd very few of them because they are not backed by the most prevalent models of uncertainty-aversion.
Result 3. A non-negligible fraction of uncertainty-averse subjects dislikes randomization.
Of the 48 uncertainty-averse subjects, 14 express a dislike for randomization (see Table 2 ). If we restrict attention to subjects for whom behavior can be predicted using the S-or C-approach because they regard the coin as fair and have no color preference on urn U, a similar picture emerges: 9 out of 29 uncertainty-averse subjects prefer the pure tickets over the mixturesee Figure 1 . In both cases, the share is statistically not distinguishable at any conventional level from the naive prediction by someone who does not know any of these theories and expects randomization aversion to occur in a third of the cases.
The observed combination of randomization and uncertainty aversion is puzzling.
The respective subjects prefer to know whether the ticket, which they receive, is white or yellowalthough they are indierent between receiving a white and a yellow ticket. Possible reasons are that knowing the color has a value in itself to these subjects, that they assign lower values to tickets when complexity is involved, or that they dislike the loss of control associated with the coin.
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7 Keren and Teigen (2008) argue that such decision makers like to maintain control. Dittmann, Kübler, Maug, and Mechtenberg (2008) nd that experimental subjects are willing to pay a premium for exerting the right to vote even if the probability that this aects the outcome is very low. On the other hand, Cettolin and Riedl (2008) observe that subjects with incomplete preferences prefer a random draw when having to decide.
In order to accommodate the behavior of these subjects, one would need a more general model which does not exogenously assume a specic relationship between uncertainty and randomization attitude. Classes of preferences that do not engender such specic relationship are the source-dependent preferences axiomatized by Chew and Sagi (2008) , the vector expected utility preferences by Siniscalchi (2008) and the monotonic, Bernoullian and continuous preferences by Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2010) .
Our second nding is related to a theoretical result by Klibano (2001) . Klibano shows that if a randomizing device is stochastically independent and Choquetexpected utility preferences are modeled in the S-approach, preferences cannot exhibit uncertainty-aversion. This implies for our context that subjects whose preferences can be modeled using the S-approach because they are uncertainty-averse and randomization-neutral should regard the coin to be correlated with urn U. In order to test this, we constructed a bet in which a ball is drawn from urn U; the subject then receives a head ticket if the ball is yellow and its certainty equivalent of a head ticket if the ball is white. Subjects who view coin and ball draw as independent should attach the same value to this bet, which we call combination ticket, and a head ticket. We restrict attention to subjects who regard the coin as fair, value white and yellow tickets on urn U equally, and are randomization-neutral. Following Klibano 's argument, we expect these subjects to be less likely to attach dierent values to the combination and head ticket if they are uncertainty-neutral. Indeed, the respective share of subjects is lower amongst uncertainty-neutral subjects (20%) than amongst other uncertainty-averse subjects (31%); however, the dierence is not signicant at any conventional level (p-value of one-sided two-sample test of proportion: 0.26). More surprising, the proportion of all subjects who value the head ticket more than the combination ticket is 37%. Put dierently, these subjects prefer a head ticket to a mixture of head ticket and its certainty equivalent. While a possible explanation is that subjects regard coin throw and ball draw as corre-lated, there is an interesting link between this nding and randomization aversion: subjects who favor the heads to the combination ticket also tend to favor tickets of a specic color to the chameleon ticket (Kendall's τ b =0.1966, p-value: 0.0559).
A rst tentative conclusion may thus be that both results are driven by the same explanation, e.g., a contempt for complexity.
Conclusions
We started our analysis with the classical observation from the two-color experiment by Ellsberg (1961) : individuals prefer to bet in situations about which they are better informed. Existing explanations for such behavior often rely on the idea that access to an objective randomization device mitigates the problem of lacking information.
Accordingly, uncertainty-averse individuals are supposed to prefer randomization.
The data from our experiment, however, does not support this view: there is no negative association between uncertainty and randomization attitude. Uncertaintyaverse subjects are more likely to be randomization-neutral than randomizationloving. This behavior can be explained within Choquet-expected utility theory, when the randomization device is modeled within the Savage setup rather than using the consequence space in the tradition of Anscombe-Aumann. However, we also observe a considerable number of uncertainty-averse subjects who exhibit a contempt for randomization. This observation indicates that for many subjects, the randomization device does not reduce but enhances the problem of missing information.
Appendix Uncertainty Attitude
In this section, we show how our denition of uncertainty attitude can be derived using the two-stage approach proposed by Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . First, we introduce the necessary notation, then we present our result.
Notation
All circumstances that aect subjects payos are represented by a state space S. An event, E, is a subset of S. The set of all possible payos is denoted by X. Objects of choice are bets, denoted by f , which are mappings from the state space S, to the set of all possible payos X. Let F be the set of all possible bets and let be a binary relation that represents subjects' preferences over F. For any bet f, g, h ∈ F we write f {g, h} to denote f g and f h.
Result
For the comparative denition of uncertainty attitudes, rst, a set of unambiguous bets needs to be determined. For Epstein (1999) , unambiguous bets are bets for which payos depend on exogenously given unambiguous events, i.e., events for which randomness is objectively known (for instance a fair coin, an urn with known proportion of balls, etc.). Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) consider only constant bets, i.e., h(s) = x for any s ∈ S with x ∈ X, as unambiguous bets. Let F ua be the set of unambiguous bets. Consider two preference relations 1 and 2 on F.
Then, 2 is said to be more uncertainty-averse than 1 if for any unambiguous bet h ∈ F ua and any bet e ∈ F :
An absolute denition of uncertainty attitudes is derived by choosing a benchmark order for uncertainty-neutral preferences B . Then, is said to be uncertainty-averse if there exists a benchmark preference relation B such that for any h ∈ F ua and any bet e ∈ F :
Conversely, is said to be uncertainty-loving if there exists a benchmark preference relation B such that for any h ∈ F ua and any bet e ∈ F :
If is both uncertainty-averse and uncertainty-loving then it is uncertainty-neutral.
With regard to the benchmark order, Epstein (1999) assumes preferences to be probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) . According to this theory subjects' subjective beliefs are represented by a unique and additive probability distribution, but preferences do not need to have expected utility representation. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) take as a benchmark all subjective expected utility preferences in the sense of Savage (1954) .
Proposition 1. Given that yellow and white ticket dened on urn K are viewed as unambiguous, y k , w k ∈ F ua , and taking subjective expected utility preferences as the benchmark, the two-stage approach yields the denition of uncertainty attitude from Denition 2.
Proof. Throughout, we consider a subject with the following preferences:
where The preferences of a subjective expected utility maximizer fall into one of the following three sets: Step 2), and uncertainty-neutrality for the last class (Step 3). These are exactly the uncertainty attitudes from Denition 2.
Step 1 
with at least one strict preference. Take B as in (6) with π B (Q K ) = π(Q K ) and:
Comparing from (9) with B as in (10), we get:
where at least one of the weak preference is strict in each row. 
with at least one strict preference in each case. As a benchmark, take B as in (6) with π
as in (11), we get:
Analogously, the comparison with as in (12), yields:
Thus, for preference ordering as in (11) and as in (12) 
with at least one strict preference. Take
Comparing the respective B with from (13), we obtain: 
with at least one strict preference in each case. Take
in (6) such that:
Comparing this B with from (15), we obtain:
Comparing the same benchmark with from (16), we get: 
Take Remark 1. Subjects who are classied as uncertainty-neutral according to our definition may not be subjective expected utility maximizers. Consider, for instance, a subject who is indierent amongst all tickets: y
This subject could be an subjective expected utility maximizer with a uniform probability distribution. On the other hand, it could also be a Choquet expected utility maximizer with a capacity However, subjects displaying such preferences would have non-additive beliefs (unless g is an identity function). Consequently, they violate expected utility and hence seem to exhibit non-neutral attitudes towards uncertainty. Here, we adopt the view that preferences in the Ellsberg paradox reect a within-subject comparison of attitudes towards uncertainty between dierent random sources (Wakker, 2001) . Accordingly, non-neutral subjects deviate more from expected utility for one random device (urn K) than for another one (urn U). In this context, the preferences as described above would indicate a violation of expected utility in an absolute sense, whereas the Ellsberg paradox concerns violation in a relative sense.
8 A capacity ν : S → [0, 1] is a normalized and monotone set function. 
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! These instructions are the same for all participants. During the experiment, we ask you to remain silent and not to talk with other participants. Please switch off your mobile phones and leave them switched off until the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimentators will come to you.
Aim and structure of the experiment
This experiment is about decisions under uncertainty. You will be presented with different tickets and asked to value these tickets. To do so, you get a choice between the ticket and different fix payments. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. Only your preferences count. Depending on your preferences, it may well be that you find this easy. Respond truthfully whether you prefer the ticket or the fix payment because these alternatives are real and not only hypothetical. So, if you decide for a ticket, you will actually get this ticket. If you decide for a fix payment, you will receive this payment.
Throughout the experiment, Taler are used as a currency unit, which are later converted at a rate of 100 Talern = 10 Cent. The amount will be rounded up to full cents and paid out. The decisions of other participants have no effect on your payoff.
Uncertainty
Three sources of uncertainty play a role for the tickets.
• A coin will be thrown and the payoff depends on whether it shows tails or heads up. We will ask you or another participant to lend us the coin.
• A Ball will be drawn from a bucket and the payoff depends on whether the ball is yellow or white. There are two buckets. In both buckets there are 20 table tennis balls. We only use table tennis balls that are either white or yellow. ○ Bucket H: Half of the balls is white, the other is yellow. ○ Bucket U: It is not known how many of the balls are white and how many are yellow. This is the only difference between bucket H and bucket U.
There are the following simple tickets:
Coin tickets
• Head ticket: A head ticket pays 100 Taler if the coin lands heads up and nothing else.
• Tail ticket: A tail ticket pays 100 Taler if the coin lands tails up and nothing else.
Color tickets
• White ticket: A white ticket pays 100 Taler if the drawn ball is white and nothing else.
• Yellow ticket: A yellow ticket pays 100 Taler if the drawn ball is yellow and nothing else.
• Chameleon ticket: The color of the chameleon ticket is determined by a coin throw. ○ If the coin lands heads up, the chameleon ticket becomes a yellow ticket. ○ If the coin lands tails up, the chameleon ticket becomes a white ticket. Dummy variables which take the value one if... no color preference subject indierent between white and yellow ticket for urn U coin fair subject regards coin as fair male subject male economics student subject studies economics business student subject studies business administration stats knowledge 1 Prob(10-sided fair dice shows 2 or less) computed correctly stats knowledge 2 Prob(two 10-sided fair dice show two ones) computed correctly stats knowledge 3 Prob(10-sided fair dice shows 4| even number)* computed correctly stats knowledge 4 Prob(10-sided fair dice shows 4| odd number) computed correctly stats knowledge 5 average payo of two bets, one which pays 100 in case of even the other pays 100 in case of odd computed correctly cognitive ability 1 correct answer to... A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? cognitive ability 2 correct answer to... 5 machines need 5 min to produce 5 pieces.
How long do 100 machines need to produce 100 pieces? cognitive ability 3 correct answer to... A lake is covered by sea roses. The covered surface doubles every day. If 48 days are needed until the lake is entirely covered, how long does it take until half the lake is covered? Variable name Subjective agreement with following statements on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) superstition There are unlucky numbers.
god God is important in my life. religion Religion gives me strength and support.
fate What one achieves in life depends on fate and luck. * Prob(A|B) denotes the conditional probability of event A to occur after the occurence of B. Signicance levels:*(5%), **(2%), ***(1%) Signicance levels:*(5%), **(2%), ***(1%)
